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Introduction
Financial intermediation has grown from infancy to late adolescence since stabilization in 1994, from tight repression to a financial boom. In 2000, bank credit amounted to 25% of GDP, and market-based lending was trifle, only 15%. Except for occasional spikes, this picture remained In this paper we first describe in detail the anatomy of this regime change from financial repression to financial boom. Based on the description of the anatomy, we raise hypotheses about the causes of financial repression and financial deepening, which are informative for developing countries in general. We then go one step further and explain why the Brazilian financial boom of the years 2000 has not turned into a financial crash, as in many other instances of financial liberalization in the Latin American past (Díaz-Alejandro [1984] ). The solidity of the Brazilian financial intermediation so far is informative for prudential measures in both emerging and mature economies.
A Brief of Description of the Brazilian Banking System
The Brazilian banking industry is a universal bank system composed of different types of banks, with diverse ownership structure (having an important presence of governmentowned banks), and a strong intervention of the federal government, in the form of prudential regulation (as in most banking systems), price regulation (not so common), and direct quantity Brazilian industry is somewhat similar to Germany's in terms of structure.
The Players
Formally, the financial system is composed of: 4 1. Deposit receiving institutions. As the name suggests, these are institutions franchised by the Central Bank (the banking regulator) to receive demand deposits from the general public, although most also receive time deposits (Certificates of Bank Deposits) and savings deposits. They can be privately-owned (both domestic and foreign), or government-owned, at both federal and state levels. They are sub-divided in:
a. Commercial Banks. Depository institutions whose main source of funding are demand and time deposits (but are allowed to issue commercial paper and borrow in the interbank market). A distinctive characteristic is that they cannot perform the functions of investment banks.
b. Multiple Banks. These are the equivalent of Universal Banks. Ordinarily, they are Multi-Bank Holding Companies that perform both the function of commercial and investment banks. All ten largest private banks and the largest government-owned bank are Multiple Banks.
c. Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF).
The first peculiarity of the Brazilian banking system. Caixa Econômica is a Federally-owned Commercial Bank whose mandate involves (in a rather ill-defined way) prioritizing lending and financing projects and programs in social assistance, health, education, and the like. It can, however, supply standard banks' loans, such as consumer credit, and working capital. It is enfranchised with several monopolies, such as lending with industrial or personal pawning collateral. More importantly, however, Caixa is a major player in recruiting savings deposits and mortgage lending.
Finally, Caixa is the depository institution of the resources of Fundo de f. Development Banks. Development Banks are state-owned (i.e., owned by the states, not the federal government) or federally-owned banks whose main function is to make long term loans to "development targeted projects". The most important development bank is, by far, the Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES). Because of its importance in
long-term financing, we dedicate a sub-Section on BNDES alone.
Chart 3 shows the market structure of the Brazilian Banking System (BBS), considering only commercial banks (public and private) and CEF. On top of what appears in Chart 3, the National Development Bank, BNDES, currently provides more than one-fifth of total credit (20.97%). Four important characteristics of the BBS emerge from chart 3. A major part of the system is composed of "universal" banks: the four main commercial banks -BRADESCO, BB, ITAU-UNIBANCO and SANTANDER -are universal banks in the sense that they all have commercial and investment banking and well as major insurance operations. Together they hold just a little under 65% of all banking assets. Brazil has a dual banking system, in which public and private commercial banks co-exist. Furthermore, BNDES alone holds almost 21% of all credit assets, as previously mentioned. As we show below the dual nature of Brazilian banking is not inconsequential for the performance of intermediation. Finally, the structure is 5 The FGTS, created in the mid-1960s, substituted the previous employment stability scheme. It is formed by 8% of the gross (pre-tax) wage bill (formal sector, which is about 60% of total employment).
Resources are deposited in personal accounts at the Caixa Econômica Federal and can be withdrawn in case of unemployment, to buy houses (the first under someone's name), and in case of terminal diseases. Annual interest rates on FGTS deposits are regulated at Taxa Referencial (TR) plus 3%. TR is an index computed as the average of 30-day CDs issues by a sample of 30 financial institutions with largest issues of CDs. A reduction (redutor) is then applied to this average rate.
concentrated: the 5 largest banks (including CEF) hold 78% of all assets. Concentration suggests (but not implies) that competitive conduct may be a problem.
Chart 3 -Market Structure by Credit Assets
Structural Determinants of the Brazilian Credit Market Performance
Until the early 2000s, the performance of the BBS was poor both in terms of quantities and prices. Total domestic credit was no more than 30% of GDP. Credit by government-owned banks represented more than half of the financial sector. In terms of prices, in 2000 the average interest rate on a bank loan was 57% annually in nominal terms when inflation was 6%. The average spread over the SELIC rate was 40 percentage points. For consumer lending the average spread was 55 percentage points. We document a major financial expansion from 2003 onwards, but interest rates are still quite high, suggesting that borrowers are very liquidity-constrained (especially consumers).
There were no lack of culprits for this poor performance: 1) high basic rates; 2) history of macroeconomic instability; 2) the dual nature of intermediation; 3) high and distortionary taxes on financial intermediation; 4) high reserve requirements; 5) informational frictions and the lack of an institution to deal with them; 6) market power. 
The dual nature of BBS: BNDES and earmarked lending
The government intervenes directly in financial intermediation through two mechanisms. First, it owns a major fraction of banking assets through BNDES, BB and CEF.
Second, it determines that a fraction of some types of deposits must be employed in financing certain sectors (earmarked lending).
Direct production in Commercial Banking and Earmarked Credit
The earmarked credit scheme has several implications for pricing and competition.
First, it increases the marginal funding cost for the banks and thus renders the non-earmarked credit segment more expensive; this phenomenon has already been documented by analysts at the Brazilian Central Bank (e.g., Costa and Lundberg [2004] , Costa and Nakane [2005] ).
Second, the effect on funding cost for the Banco do Brasil's non-earmarked loans is strong because 50% of its funding is allocated to the non-earmarked segment. Third, this scheme differentiates BB from private commercial banks as a result of its focus on a segment that private banks often avoid serving. Differentiation softens competition and thus leads to higher prices. Fourth, Arrigoni et al (2011) provide strong evidence that the presence of governmentowned banks softens competition because they operate with higher costs.
Similar to the S&L institutions in the U.S. in the 1980s, savings accounts in Brazil pay low regulated interest rates. They carry an implicit complete guarantee from the National Treasury. In general, banks find the funding for savings accounts to be inexpensive. However, 65% of the funding is earmarked to mortgages. In net terms, private banks achieve better results when they choose not to focus on savings because they find long-term mortgages expensive even with the subsidy in savings accounts. Costa and Nakane (2006) show that market-based lending cross-subsidize earmarked lending. They also estimate the impact of earmarked lending on spreads of non-earmarked loans. They find 7.6% of the spread is due to the mortgage and rural credit. Thus, the dual nature of the financial intermediation has an adverse impact on market-based lending through two channels.
BNDES
BNDES is a federally held development bank. Its stated goal is to support and fund projects that are strategic for development. In practice, it was for a long time the main source of long-term finance for Brazilian companies. The BNDES's main source of funding is the Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhor -FAT (Workers' Aid Fund). The FAT's resources (besides the return of previous investments) come basically from the contribution to PIS-PASEP (a federal tax) and serve two purposes: they are used to pay for short-term aid to unemployed workers, and to provide BNDES with funds to be used in its credit operations and development programs.
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These funds are earmarked to finance BNDES's lending operations.
With total assets amounting to US$312.6 billion 7 in 2010, BNDES is one of the largest development banks in the world. 8 Financing large, long-term projects is BNDES's main task.
From 1999 to 2006, roughly 36% of its loans were classified as large projects, which normally have maturities longer than 7 years. Another 30% were classified as small projects, which are usually equipment financing and working capital for medium-sized firms. The remaining 24% is export financing. Most of BNDES' disbursements are directed to large firms, which otherwise would not have full access to financial markets. Chart 4 shows how BNDES disbursements are divided between firm sizes: on average, three-fourths are destined to large firms.
6 Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador (FAT) is a fund whose resources come from PIS-PASEP. In general, the contribution to PIS-PASEP is paid by firms according to the following rule: 0.65% of the gross revenue and 1% of the total payroll of the firm. The FAT is managed by a council whose members are chosen by the federal administration. In any case, the sheer size that BNDES has currently achieved poses a fiscal challenge.
Having exhausted its natural sources of cheap funding, the aforementioned forced savings funds, BNDES has resorted in the last three years to subsidized finance (at the TJLP rate) from Notwithstanding the law's objectives, the banking system that actually developed was, in fact, much less segmented. As recognition of this fact, in 1988, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) introduced a unified accounting plan (COSIF) for all financial institutions, and the National Monetary Council (CMN) created the Multiple Bank (universal bank). Since then, it became legally possible to have financial conglomerates that operated under a holding company capable of offering almost all financial services. A multiple bank was defined as a financial institution that could operate no less than two and no more than four of the five former segmented financial institutions. The other major reform was to scrap the old charter system. Until then, to create a bank, one would have to purchase the charter (carta-patente) from another existing bank. After 1988, the CMN and the BCB could freely issue charters for new banks.
Brazil was one the last countries to conquer inflation, in 1994. Hyperinflation in Brazil was a very protracted process. During its several years, banks had to learn how to do financial intermediation in a hyperinflationary environment. They did so essentially by providing firms and individuals a close substitute for money, a domestic currency substitute 11 (DCS). Banks provided DCS investing heavily in governments securities (short-term or indexed) and paying interest in special deposit accounts, which had the similar check-writing privileges to regular non-interest-bearing checking accounts. Many times this was accomplished by computerized 10 Carneiro, Garcia and Werneck (1993) . 11 Carneiro and Garcia (1994) .
systems (not widely available in the 80s) that automatically transferred funds from interestbearing deposit accounts to the regular checking account when a check was cleared.
As hyperinflation evolved, Brazilian banks' profitability became more and more dependent on the so-called banks' inflation float, i.e. the spread between the nominal interest rate paid by government securities and the average interest rate paid on the deposits. Under hyperinflation, the float of a non-interest bearing demand deposit is huge. Therefore, banks overinvested in branches to be able to capture more deposits, as well as in information technology, to better manage their bank reserves so that almost no excess reserves were left at the BCB. Silva (2009) 
The Real Plan, Banking Crisis and Bailout
We start by offering a brief description of the plan that finally conquered hyperinflation. The Real Plan was the last of a sequence of plans that tried to stabilize inflation in Brazil. It introduced a new currency, the real (BRL). The Real Plan aimed at reducing fiscal deficits, modernizing the economy and mitigating the distortions that arose from previous price freezes. and it increased taxes on financial intermediaries. Regarding monetary policy, the printing press was shut down and extremely high interest rates became the norm. A initial ceiling for the exchange rate was set at R$ 1,00, but the confidence in the plan, together with the extremely high interest rates appreciated the new currency to levels significantly below the nominal parity.
The incomes policy part of the Real Plan was unlike all the previous failed plans, which had resorted to price freezings. A new unit of account URV -Unidade Real de Valor (Real Unit Value) was created months before the launching of the new currency, establishing a parallel currency to the cruzeiro real. The idea was for it to be temporary and while the cruzeiro real suffered from hyperinflation, the URV would not. Prices were quoted both in URVs and cruzeiros reais, but payments had to be made exclusively in cruzeiros reais. The URV worked like a shadow currency that had its parity to the cruzeiro real defined, since it was 1-to-1 with the American dollar. Therefore, a daily conversion of the URV/cruzeiro novo (the old currency) rate was quoted. In this manner, when the new currency was launched, replacing the URV, all economic agents were used to quote their prices in the new currency.
13 Souza e Silva (2009), p. 12.
For the banking system, the Real Plan was a very strong shock, and, at least in the beginning, a mixed blessing. It ended a substantial revenue source for banks (the bank float), while, at the same time, opening many great new opportunities. However, before banks could profit from those, a banking crisis occurred.
Banking system stability was a major collateral damage of monetary stabilization. As the famous investor Warren Buffet put it: when the tide is low, one sees who has been swimming naked. The high tide in Brazilian banking was inflationary floating, whose revenues hid holes in banks' balance sheets. Fragility, more often than not, was produced by straight fraud and corruption, as in the case of Banco Nacional.
The stabilization disciplining effect was felt harder, but not exclusively, by state-owned public banks. In December, 1994, BANESPA, owned by the state of São Paulo, was put under receivership by the federal banking authority (the Central Bank). BANERJ, the bank owned by the state of Rio de Janeiro, and many others, also went into receivership and were later privatized.
14 Some private banks fared no better, including two large private banks, Banco Nacional and Banco Econômico.
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The bail-out programs of the private and provincial banks cost 8.7% of GDP, with the majority of costs due to province-level banks (more than six times larger than private banks).
In addition, a ghost that had haunted the mortgage market during years finally was recognized during the Cardoso administration. It cost another 8.7% of GDP. All in all, the cleaning-up of the Brazilian financial system cost 17.4% of GDP during the Cardoso government.
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With the instability of the banking system, and the government incurring in big costs to save it, it is not surprising that financial intermediation did not take off before 2000. Chart 1 shows a longer picture. A brief moment of euphoria occurred after stabilization, most likely driven by a demand shift due the large income transfer to lower income classes. After that, financial intermediation stumbled continuously until 2000.
14 To cite the two most important examples; the federal government auctioned off BANESPA to SANTANDER in 2000. BANERJ was acquired by Itaú. 15 Banco Nacional was acquired by UNIBANCO, turning it into the 3rd largest private bank in the country. Unibanco acquired the "good" banks, purged of unrecoverable assets that remained with the federal government. 16 Lundberg (2011).
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Another reason it took so long for financial intermediation to take off is the sequence of international crises that hit Brazil. 
The Financial Boom
Chart 1 shows the unequivocal increase in financial intermediation in Brazil during the years 2000. What explains such increase? Was it accompanied by an increase in risk taking by banks? Or was it driven by institutional improvements? Understanding the main driving forces behind the deepening of the Brazilian financial sector provides insights not only about Brazil, but also about other similar countries facing financial booms.
The specific mechanisms behind the 2000s boom are: 1) banks had been deprived of inflationary float from the pre-stabilization period, and had to look for other sources of revenue; 2) through the bank lending channel, decreases in basic interest rates reduced cost of funding for banks, i.e., a reduction in marginal costs (see Chart 5)
20
; 3) institutional 20 The high equilibrium interest rate in consumer lending suggests serious liquidity constraints on borrowers. In this case, one would imagine that credit demand would be rather inelastic, shutting down the bank lending channel. However, Coelho et al (2010) document the importance of the bank lending channel in Brazil. 
Chart 9-BNDES Credit
Before we move to the specific institutional improvements, we put the financial boom in Brazil into international perspective. Table 1 shows the relative position of 32 countries for which data was available for Charts 10 and 11 are informative on the size of the Brazilian banking sector given its institutions. The horizontal axis contains a measure of institutional development the number of years to resolve insolvency, a measure of the quality of bankruptcy law and courts. We interpret it as a proxy for the level institutional development of credit markets. In sum, given its institutional settings, Brazil was neither over nor under financially 
Brazil vis-à-vis the World

Payroll Lending 23
Payroll lending to public-sector retirees and public servants has existed in Brazil since early late 1990s. Private-sector retirees and employees were excluded. 24 In December 2003, congress passed a bill that stipulated the regulations for underwriting payroll loans to privatesector retirees and employees (Law 10,820, 2003) . 22 Another important development was the introduction of Alienação Fiduciária for assets other than financial securities. Alienação Fiduciária allows for the transfer of collateral ownership to lenders until the final payment of the loan. No hard evidence is yet available, but the sharp improvements in the pricing of automobile loans suggests a significant impact of Alienação Fiduciária. 23 This Sub-section draws heavily from Costa and De Mello (2008) and Arrigoni, De Mello and Funchal (2011) . 24 The stability of the future income stream is crucial for payroll deduction to be reliable as a guarantee. However, the law had little impact during the early 1990s because of macroeconomic instability that hindered the advance of financial intermediation in general. 
Year 2008
The law regulates the procedures through which commercial banks underwrite payroll loans to private-sector employees and to those receiving social security benefits from the Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), the federally run pay-as-go pension system. Among other regulations, the law mandates that the principal and interest amount to no more than 30% of the borrower's income. INSS beneficiaries constitute the largest market for payroll lending (roughly 50% in 2008).
Chart 13 illustrates the impressive impact of payroll lending. Loans underwritten under this category soared, both in absolute and relative terms. 
The New Bankruptcy Law
In February 2005, congress approved the New Bankruptcy Law (Nova Lei de Falências). 25 For credit markets, the most important change brought by the new legislation concerns the order of debt seniority. By the old law, the federal, state and municipal governments were senior to any debtor. Seniority applied to both taxes and social security debts. Following the government came labor liabilities, and only then came ordinary creditors.
The new law changes seniority. Now, labor liabilities are senior to any other. Then come fiscal debts and debtors with so-called real collateral with the same status. Real collateral means a physical asset, not a third-party guarantee.
Although there is little precise measurement of the effects of the New Bankruptcy Law, it is widely believed that the law pushed credit supply upwards and, therefore, is one of the contributing microeconomic factors behind the recent boom in credit markets. 
Alienação Fiduciária for Automobile Loans
The Medida Provisória 2.160-25 from August 2001 regulates Alienação fiduciária.
When an asset is under Alienação Fiduciária, its property lies with the creditor until the loan is paid in full (although the control of the asset lies with the borrower). It is similar to leasing. 
Institutional Advances in Capital Markets: the NOVO MERCADO
Market based long-term financing has improved over the last decade. For decades, private capital markets were as irrelevant in practice as mechanisms for long-term financing. Source: Garcia (2011) 27 Garcia (2011) writes: "In many companies, most of the shares had no voting rights, which allowed a minority to control the management and frequently generated inefficiencies. Various cases of expropriation (tunneling) of the "minority majority" by the "controlling minority" were not properly controlled." In fact, Dyck and Zingales (2003) estimate that in the 1990s private benefits of control in Brazil were the highest in the world. 28 Among the other improvements are: 1) increased penalties for non-compliers, and the establishment of the Terms of Undertaking, in which the investigated or accused party, without admitting culpability, agrees to cease practicing the activities considered illicit by the CVM. See Garcia (2011) . Brazilian Banking System was probably ready for a major push forward in 2000, but macroeconomic instability preceding Lula's election was in the way. Furthermore, the second wave of microeconomic reforms, including those of credit markets, started only in 1999-2000, and acquired momentum during the first Lula administration. We argued that the financial boom was mostly driven by positive supply shocks, which has consequences for the stability of the banking system. 
Stability during the Boom and during the Crisis
Why are Brazilian Banks so Prudent? Some Conjectures
Ownership Structure
A typical Brazilian bank is a listed company with on large controlling shareholder whose cash rights in the company are significant. Table 4 shows the ownership breakdown of ITAU-UNIBANCO and BRADESCO, the two largest commercial private banks. and Iupar have almost 90% of voting shares. In both cases, the controlling shareholders own a significant share of cash rights (33% and 45%, respectively).
Arguably, this structure is more conductive to cautious behavior. In contrast to dispersed ownership, a large shareholder is able to internalize the gains from monitoring. In the absence of monitoring, alignment of managers' and shareholders' interests is normally based on pay-for-performance, which could lead to excessive risk-taking, as was the case in the US during the 1990s and 2000s.
Public (in the sense of government-owned) banks also have a concentrated ownership structure. In their case, it is difficult to gauge risk-taking. Typically, risk-taking behavior in public sector is not well compensated and thus one might expected better underwriting in public banks. However, public banks have an explicit mandate to lend at preferential rates to some sector (see Section 3.1.1). Default rates in these lines tend to be quite high. Arrigoni et al (2011) After the general failures of state-level public banks in the late 1990s, the federal government now owns the vast majority of public banking assets. For all practical purposes, depositors and investors in general evaluate federally owned banks as having little more sovereign risk. In this context, federal ownership of banking assets may be a force favoring stability. Perhaps the taxpayer will have to foot the bill of many equivocate underlying decisions. But as far as stability is concerned, the dual character of the BBS leads to it.
Regulatory Apparatus
The Central Bank of Brazil is the only supervisor of all commercial banks, investment banks and bank-holding companies, a fact not inconsequential to banking stability.
First, and differently from the US and Europe, no regulatory arbitrage arises in a nationally unified regulation: states do compete to attract the headquarters of national banks by relaxing regulation. Deposit insurance is not an option.
The fact that the monetary authority is responsible for supervision is also conductive to stability. For example, the Central Bank is mainly responsible for horizontal merger analysis.
It comes out as very lenient with potentially anti-competitive merger because its mandate is stability.
Rating agencies in Brazil are not nearly as important for the Brazilian financial and capital markets as are US rating agencies. Private credit bureaus also play a minor role. The Central Bank has thus invested substantially in building its own credit intelligence system: the Central Bank Credit Information System (CIS). This initiative was adopted in 1997 as the Credit Risk Center. The CIS is the largest register containing data on the debtor behavior in the financial system. The data are shared by participating institutions. This contributes to fewer defaults and improved credit risk management.
The CIS has information about the operations granted by financial institutions on a monthly basis. The CIS database stores the operations of clients with total liability greater than or equal to R$ 5,000 (US% 3,200), both due and overdue, as well as the amounts for collateral and pledges provided by financial institutions to their clients. Using this information, the banking supervisory bodies can identify with great precision financial institutions with credit problems which require special monitoring, thus achieving their main goal. The CIS is different from an ordinary Credit Bureau in a dimension very important for bank stability. Credit bureaus contain information on borrowers. The CIS contains also readily available information at the lender level, which is quite important for performing stress tests and monitoring systemic risk.
In sum, relatively to the US, Brazil has a fairly concentrated banking system with large and national banks. While a too big to fail effect could be more important in Brazil, the largest banks have clear owners (sometimes the government itself). Supervision is also concentrated.
The Central Bank plays an important role as the main informational broker. The main credit bureau in the country is publicly run. Thus, differently from credit agencies, one may believe that conflict of interest is less of an issue. 30 The regulatory market is much less laissez-faire, which is perhaps good for systemic stability.
Finally, one may argue that the stability during of the BBS during the years 2000s is accidental. A pessimist may argue that financial crisis, in general and in Latin America in particular, are, at best, cyclical. Brazil had the "good fortune" of having had a banking crisis in the second-half of the 1990s. After stabilization, the weakest links in the BBS were exposed, having swam naked for many long years. Most bad banking assets were retired from the BBS balance sheet. In short, Brazil had a fresh start in the 2000s. Given this outlook of an overheating economy and the rise in inflation, the Central Bank raised the base interest rate, the Selic. Reserve requirements were also imposed on leasing companies, which had been taking advantage of a breach in the regulations to win markets. In addition, the foreign currency positions of financial institutions were limited, which was shown to be very useful in the crisis that unfolded. There was no capital flight, as in previous crises, but rather a reallocation of deposits, which migrated from smaller institutions, judged to be weaker, to larger institutions (or public banks, judged to be less of a risk). In this way, the BCB sought to alleviate the lack of liquidity that was affecting the smaller institutions. During liquidity crises, as happened in the latter months of 2008, the BCB was able to inject liquidity into the system by releasing substantial amounts of banks' reserve requirements.
The International Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath
There 35 Mesquita and Torós (2010) . 36 Mesquita and Torós (2010 Mesquita and Torós (2010), p. 198 . More formally, Leão (2011) shows that small banks suffered a run on their deposits. He uses bank-level deposit and credit data to shows that the run was driven by institutional investor, and was especially strong on small banks that relied on market liquidity for funding. His results suggest that the TDSG instrument was indeed crucial to provide funding liquidity when market liquidity dried-up, restoring confidence in the banking system.
Measures were also taken to facilitate the use of the rediscount window, although this was not used, as the CGF played this role. Moreover, the Credit Guarantee Fund (CGF) was given permission to guarantee issues by small-sized institutions, and this measure was very successful. Such measures prevented many banks from failing at the height of the crisis.
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The state-owned banks also served as a direct instrument of governmental intervention in the credit and banking market. Throughout 2008, the credit operations of the public banks grew by 40%, whilst the credit provided by private banks rose by 27%. The role of the public banks was more decisive in the last quarter of 2008. The total credit granted by public banks rose by 12.9%, while the rise in the private sector was of 3.2%. In turn, public banks acquired holdings in some smaller private banks, giving them a cushion of capital in the midst of the crisis.
Given the enormous rise in volatility, the BM&FBovespa raised the margins required for derivatives trading. Although this increased the need for liquidity, they were deemed necessary to reduce the systemic risk involved in derivatives trading on the stock exchange.
The BCB also guaranteed the smooth working of the credit market in foreign currency.
Although it was heavily criticized at the time, the floating exchange rate system was left to work freely, offering its reserves in quite a focused form, so that flows of international trade were not interrupted. As of the last quarter of 2008, it was not clear that the international anti-crisis measures would be successful, so the BCB decided to save its reserves for a possible prolonged period of scarcity of credit from abroad. The option to leave the exchange rate floating freely was also taken so as not to bail out companies speculating with foreign currency During the crisis, the Central Bank sold US$ 14.5 billion, just 7% of the reserves held at the outbreak of the crisis. Repos (foreign currency sales with future repurchase agreements)
were sold for a total of US$ 11.8 billion and loans were granted in US dollars for US$ 12.6 billion, out of which US$ 9 billion were directed at foreign trade. 
Concluding Remarks
Brazil is a remarkable recent example of a major financial repression followed by financial expansion. Several lessons can be draw from the Brazilian example.
Macroeconomic stability was a necessary condition for the expansion. By some metrics, the BBS was quite deep during the early 1990s. However, the system was not deep but hypertrophied by inflation. Banks were not in the business of extending credit but of recruiting deposits to lend short-term to the government, making a quick buck many times over in the overnight market and through inflationary float. The extent of the hypertrophy can be gauged by the banking crisis that followed stabilization and the consequent shrinkage of the BBS after 1994. After price stability, the balance sheet of the system was over-burdened by bad decisions made during inflationary times. It took a few years, and two programs that cost almost 18% of the GDP, to clean-up banks balance sheets. When the BBS was finally ready to take off, the perspective of LULA taking office postponed the boom for another couple of years.
Suddenly, the system was ripe for boom in 2003, and boomed it did. Just as the macroeconomy set the stage, but micro-level institutional advances most likely played an
